Anecdotal evidence suggests that uncontrolled managers let wages rise above competitive levels. Testing this belief, however, has proven di cult because independent variation in the extent of managerial discretion is needed. In this paper, we use states' passage of anti-takeover legislation as a source of such independent variation. Passed in the 1980s, these laws substantially limited takeovers of rms incorporated i n l e gislating states. Since many view hostile takeovers as an important disciplining device, these laws potentially raised managerial discretion in a ected rms. If uncontrolled managers pay higher wages, we expect wages to rise following these laws. Using rm-level data, we nd that relative t o a c ontrol group, annual wages for rms incorporated in states passing laws did indeed rise by 1 to 2 or about $500 per year. The ndings are robust to a battery of speci cation checks and do not appear to be c ontaminated by the political economy of the laws or other sources of bias. Our results suggest that discretion signi cantly a ects wages. They challenge standard theories of wage determination which ignore the role of managerial preferences. J E LJ30, M12, G30
INTRODUCTION
Theorists have long recognized that the separation of ownership and control warps managerial incentives: managers neither bear the full costs of their actions nor reap the full bene ts of their e orts. Costly discretion results, in which managers' personal concerns interfere with decision making. While the e ects of managerial discretion on nancing and product market decisions have been studied, its e ects on labor market decisions are not well explored. Many anecdotes and newspaper articles hint that poorly controlled managers pay higher wages. When under pressure, bloated corporations trim fat by slashing wages and eliminating jobs. Successful corporate raiders often capture premiums by staring down unions into wage concessions. Even in non-unionized rms, one often hears of takeovers being followed by drastic cuts in wages and bene ts. These stories depict a world in which w orkers' wages are in uenced by managers' discretion. Of course, we are not arguing that owners do not maximize pro ts, only that managers may not. Even this argument is at odds with existing models of wage determination, including rent sharing and e ciency wage models, because these models require that wages beset in a pro t maximizing manner. In this paper, we empirically investigates whether increased managerial discretion raises worker wages.
Since wages are easily observed, what is the source of managerial discretion in setting wages?
Certainly, o wners know what wages are being paid to workers. On the other hand, they probably
do not know what wages should be paid. While they may observe general labor supply conditions, they may not observe many of the rm-speci c supply conditions. They will not have the detailed knowledge|such as quality of applicants or ease of lling positions|needed to infer the optimal wage in speci c occupation-experience categories. This asymmetry of information means that owners nd it di cult to judge whether wages are too high or too low. A moral hazard problem arises and equilibrium wages are distorted.
Managerial preferences determine the direction of this distortion. There are many reasons to believe that managers act as if they prefer" high wages. First, they might care more about having high quality workers and low turnover than owners do. Second, in a union context, they might dislike putting forth bargaining e ort. Finally, they might care more than owners about improving workplace relations as they are the ones that endure the workers' complaints and enjoy the workers' company. Foulkes 1980 and Milkovich and Newman 1987 provide evidence consistent with a managerial preference for higher wages. They document that managers care about their relative position in the wage distribution and invest a considerable amount of resources in conducting complex surveys to learn about competitors' wages. A conventional wage policy consists of leading" competitors' wages. When asked why they want to lead the wage distribution, managers sometimes mention the ability to retain workers, the ability to select from a larger applicant pool or the desire to pay fair wages. Yet, very often, managers seem to show an extreme determination to lead the wage distribution without any clear reason provided except for the desire to be there".
While evocative, such evidence can be interpreted in other ways|perhaps managers don't always know w h y something maximizes pro ts, they just know that it does|and, hence, motivates formal empirical work.
Testing the hypothesis that managerial discretion raises wages requires independent v ariation in the extent of the agency problem, which has traditionally been di cult to nd. State antitakeover legislation potentially provides the needed variation. Takeovers are traditionally viewed as a mechanism for disciplining wayward managers Manne, 1965; and Jensen, 1984 and Jensen, , 1986 and Jensen, and 1988 Managers recognize that if they fail to maximize pro ts, they endanger themselves by risking takeover and subsequent job loss. By raising the cost of takeovers, anti-takeover laws insulate managers from takeover pressures and potentially dull their incentives to maximize pro ts. 1 These laws directly in uence moral hazard and, therefore, may better proxy for managerial discretion than measures such as rm size or earnings. If managerial discretion in uences wages, we expect a ected rms' wages to rise with the passage of anti-takeover laws. 2 Using a di erences-in-di erences methodology, w e nd evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
Our estimates imply that state anti-takeover laws raised average annual wages by 1 to 2 or about $500 per year in a ected rms. We include rm xed e ects and year dummies, control for observable rm characteristics, allow the impact of these characteristics to vary from year to year and control for pre-existing wage trends speci c to legislating states. We further investigate the dynamics of the e ect, to see whether the laws' e ect" appears before the laws. Our results are surprisingly robust to all of these speci cations checks.
Is there an alternative interpretation to our ndings? First, compensating di erentials can easily be ruled out since they predict that the anti-takeover laws should decrease wages, not increase them. Decreased takeover fears increase job security and should lower wages. Second, one might worry that our ndings are driven by CEOs increasing their own pay when given more discretion.
However, the quantitative size of our estimates combined with the size of the rms in our sample make it very unlikely that the wage increases are restricted only to CEOs. While we can rule out pay increases to executives as the driving force, our results do not discriminate between pay increases to white collar versus blue collar workers, for example. Finally, in Section 7, we argue that political economy or survivorship biases likely do not contaminate our results.
The ndings in this paper are consistent with a much older institutional literature in labor economics. Both Lester 1952 and Reynolds 1951 argued that wages exhibit a range of indeterminateness". Based on many plant visits they believed that, unlike in the simple marginal rule implied by pro t maximization, managers choose from a range or band of feasible wage levels.
One of the factors that Lester and Reynolds cited as generating this range of indeterminateness was managerial characteristics. They already acknowledged that owners and managers might h a ve di erent goals and that the classical model can only explain a portion of reality". To date, support for the range of indeterminateness model has been limited to the disputed ndings on inter-industry wage di erentials Slichter, 1950; Dickens and Katz, 1987; and Krueger and Summers, 1980 , the rm size e ect Brown and Medo , 1989 and more generally rm xed e ects in wages Abowd and Kramarz, 1997. Our test isolates a speci c mechanism|takeover pressure|which determines a rm's position in the range of feasible wage rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie y discusses related empirical research. Section 3 presents the state anti-takeover laws. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 explains the empirical methodology. We present our results in Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss alternative i n terpretations of our results and also describe the channels through which managerial discretion can increase workers' wages. Finally, w e conclude in Section 8.
RELATED Empirical Work
Our work is close in spirit to the expense preference literature. Inspired by Williamson 1964 , papers such as Edwards 1977 and Hannan and Mavinga 1980 have tested the idea that a more competitive e n vironment forces management to cut frivolous expenditures. These papers typically study the banking industry, and generally nd that increased product market concentration raises expenses on o ce space and increases employment levels. They argue that since competition reduces agency problems, this is evidence for increased discretion raising expenses. 3 Heywood 1986 provides an alternative test of the expense preference theory relying on international trade. Since imports a ect product market concentration, Heywood uses import penetration as a proxy for product market structure. He concentrates on the impact of import penetration on wages and nds that higher import penetration lowers wages. These papers all proxy for managerial discretion with competition, which raises two concerns. First, theory is unclear about the link between product market competition and discretion. Hart 1983 presents a model where competition lowers discretion and Scharfstein 1988 presents one where competition raises discretion. Second, competition can independently a ect expenses by acting through channels other than discretion.
For example, Heywood 1986 himself notes that his results are also consistent with decreased union bargaining power or factor price equalization. In the banking context, increased concentration may force banks to compete on quality dimensions rather than on price dimensions e.g. fees. Therefore, increased expenses may merely re ect this increased pro t maximizing quality competition.
An independent literature has studied the e ects of ownership changes. Brown and Medo 1988 use unemployment insurance data and nd mixed e ects of ownership changes on employment and wages. Using the Longitudinal Research Database, Lichtenberg 1992 nds that ownership changes a ect white collar wages. Rosett 1990 demonstrates that union employees su er wage losses following takeovers, though the results are not statistically signi cant. Gokhale, Groshen and Neumark 1995 nd that takeovers atten the wage-seniority pro le and reduce employment of senior workers. While interesting in its own right, this literature has not been able to identify the impact of managerial discretion on wages. 4 Since the rms under study actually change ownership, an endogeneity bias arises that makes the results hard to interpret. Changes in ownership are conditioned on past and future expected rm performance, all of which m a y in uence wages even in the absence of managerial discretion. Similarly, a host of other factors such as quality of management and operating practices may c hange with ownership, which again may in uence the optimal wage.
Krueger 1991 investigates the e ect of ownership structure on wages by looking at the difference between franchises and company owned stores in the fast food industry. He nds that company o wned stores pay higher wages and have steeper wage pro les than franchises. Since company o wned stores have more di culties with the separation of ownership and control, this nding can be interpreted as evidence for discretion in wage setting. A complementary interpretation, preferred by Krueger, is e ciency wages: owner-operated stores may have a harder time monitoring workers than franchises. His data do not allow one to distinguish between these interpretations.
In summary, the literature provides only ambiguous evidence about the e ects of managerial discretion on wages because it relies on indirect sources of variation in discretion, a point many o f t h e authors recognize. 5 By explicitly varying the parameters of the agency relationship, anti-takeover legislation potentially provide a better estimate of the impact of discretion on wages. 7 In this paper, we will focus mainly on BC laws because they induced the largest change in the incentive structure faced by management. BCs impose a moratorium 3 to 5 years on speci ed transactions between the target and a raider holding a speci ed threshold percentage of stock, unless the board votes otherwise. Speci ed transactions include sale of assets, mergers and business relationships between raider and target. Since these transactions are essential to nancing highly leveraged takeovers, which rely on sales of the target's assets, BC laws give the board the power to block such takeovers. But, since management often has a great deal of control over the board, incumbent management then has increased power to block such takeovers. Therefore, BC laws seem to entrench management by allowing them the right to veto" a hostile takeover. 8 The legal rulings also generally re ect the idea that BC laws tip the balance of power towards management. In Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Food Corp., a landmark case on BC legislation, the court ruled that BC laws did indeed violate management-shareholder neutrality, that it favored management. But, the ruling went on to state that this violation was not grounds for overturning the law. As another example, Justice Schwartz, deciding on the Delaware BC law, concluded that it altered the balance of power between management and raider, perhaps signi cantly." See Sroufe and Gelband 1990. As one commentator noted, an implication of the Wisconsin decision was that The Seventh Circuit's Amanda opinion asserts that a law, such as Wisconsin's business combination statute, can be both economic folly and constitutional" New York Law Journal, September 14, 1989. Our focus will be on the shift in power towards management that these laws caused. They give management the power through the board to impede takeovers, generating for us variation in the amount of managerial discretion. 9 
STATE Takeover Laws

EVIDENCE on Impact of Laws
Anecdotal evidence on the importance of the state anti-takeover laws is plentiful. A mass of cases often followed each law where raiders attempted to argue against the law. 10 This indicates that target companies understood the laws well enough to use them as defenses and that raiders felt the laws as a large enough deterrent to success to challenge them in court. Moreover, these laws received extensive c o verage by both the popular press and legal practitioners.
Empirical work on the laws typically falls under two categories: studies of their impact on takeovers and studies of their impact on stock prices. 11 Hackl and Testani 1988 perform a straightforward di erences-in-di erences analysis for laws up to 1988 and nd that these laws lessen takeover activity. States passing laws experienced approximately a 48 smaller rise in takeover attempts in this period. They also nd that the proportion of takeover attempts using tender o ers went d o wn, as well as the number of tender o er attempts that were successful.
Several papers have attempted to establish the e ect of these laws on stock prices and almost all of these focus on a single law Karpo and Malatesta, 1989; Pound, 1987; Szewczyk and Tsetsekos, 1992; Romano, 1987 , Margotta et al., 1990 Schumann, 1989; and Block et al., 1986 . By and large, these studies tend to nd negative e ects of the laws on share prices, though some are insigni cant or zero. 12 The most relevant study for our purposes is by Karpo 
DATA
In order to determine which rms are a ected by anti-takeover legislation, we must know each rm's state of incorporation. We also would need to focus on wages in large, publicly traded rms, since these are the ones that realistically face takeover threat. Therefore, we use COMPUSTAT data, one of the few data sources which include both labor data and corporate variables such as state of incorporation. 13 COMPUSTAT reports nancial variables for more than 7500 individual corporations established in the U.S. and territories since 1976. The data are drawn from annual reports, 10-K lings and 10-Q lings, and samples large companies with substantial public ownership. We use all data available between 1976 and 1995. Since the laws were passed in the middle and late 1980s, this gives us several years before and after the laws.
Ideally, we would like state of incorporation some time before the laws' passage, but unfortunately the COMPUSTAT tapes only have state of incorporation in 1995 or the state of incorporation in the nal year if the rm died before then. Company representatives told us that they do not archive the old information. Existing evidence, however, indicates that changes in state of incorporation are very rare, especially in the later years that dominate our sample Peterson, 1988 and Romano, 1985 . To further verify this, we randomly sampled 75 rms from our sample and checked, using Moody's Industrial Manual, whether they'd changed states of incorporation in our sample period. Consistent with previous evidence, we found only three changes in state of incorporation and these were all to Delaware two in 1985 and one in 1986, predating the 1988 law. This suggests that using the state of incorporation in 1995 will not bias our results.
The labor data provided by COMPUSTAT are aggregate with no direct wage measure reported.
Instead, we compute wages using the labor expenses and employment data. Labor expenses include salaries, wages, pension costs, pro t sharing, incentive compensation, payroll taxes and other employee bene ts; they exclude commissions. Employment is de ned as the numberof company workers as reported to shareholders in annual reports. It is reported by some rms as an average numberof employees over the year and by others as the numberof employees at the end of the year; it includes part-time and seasonal employees; it excludes contract workers, consultants and employees of unconsolidated subsidiaries. 14 We build the wage measure by dividing labor expenses by reported employment.
The resulting labor data are extremely spotty both across rms and time. Many rms report no labor data and some report it only intermittently. More importantly, there are large outliers when one computes rm by rm annual growth rates of wages. 15 While our results are una ected by the inclusion of these outliers, we are uncomfortable using these data points. Hence, we decide to exclude from most of our regressions rms that at any point display aberrant wage changes.
Speci cally, we drop any rm i for which there exists a period t during which the ratio w t+1 wt is greater than 7 4 or less than 4 7 , where these numbers were chosen for simplicity: they represent 75 changes and the inverse. Practically, this results in excluding rms for which a t a n y point in time the wage growth rate is unreasonably positive more than 75 or unreasonably negative less than ,44. This exclusion rule leads to a loss of 547 rm-year observations. Table 3 demonstrates that our results are insensitive to the use of this speci c exclusion rule. There we show the results for 50 growth and its inverse. That table also shows that we get similar estimates even if we keep these outliers. An alternative would be to estimate a median regression, but this is computationally intractable because rm xed e ects produce a large numberof independent variables. Table 3 shows, however, median regressions without rm xed e ects, where we see qualitatively similar results.
Our nal sample consists of 877 rms over the period 1976-1995 and of 9305 rm-year cells. It consists of all the rms ever in existence during the sample period, for whom we can compute wage data for every year they are in existence, and whose wage growth does not exhibit outliers. 16 It thus includes rms that disappeared from COMPUSTAT before 1995 as well as rms that appeared in COMPUSTAT after 1976. Over this time period, there are 49,474 rm-year cells for rms which report state of incorporation and are incorporated in the U.S. Our data, therefore, represents 18:8 of this full sample, with the dissipation coming because many rms do not report labor data. Our sample is a larger proportion of rm-year observations than of rms because larger and hence longer lasting rms are more likely to report labor expenses. Table 1 presents means of the variables of interest. In columns 1 and 2, we compare the full COMPUSTAT sample to our sample. Columns 3 and 4 compare, within our sample, treatment group rms incorporated in states that pass BC laws at some point and control group rms incorporated in states that never pass BC laws. While we present the means of the log variables, the means of the levels are presented in brackets for our sample. Wages are expressed in thousands of dollars, and employment in thousands of employees. Assets is total assets current assets plus net property, plant and equipment plus other non-current assets in thousands of dollars. Sales is net sales gross sales reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers in thousands of dollars. Market value is the end of year stock market value of the rm in thousands of dollars. Wages, assets, sales and market value are de ated using the CPI 1983-1984=100.
SUMMARY Statistics
As one can see by comparing columns 1 and 2 the rms in our sample are signi cantly larger on average than the rms in the full sample. 17 The next two columns allow us to compare rms incorporated in states passing BC legislation and those in states not passing BC legislation. First, one will note that many of the rms in our sample are located in states passing BC laws. However, as we explain more carefully in Section 5, this does not cause our e ective control group to be small. Since the states staggered their passage of laws, the e ective control group for any given year is the set of states not passing laws that year. Second, rms passing BC legislation appear slightly larger on all dimensions. Because we use rms xed e ects, our empirical methodology allows us to deal with any xed di erence between treatment and control rms. Other problems potentially arise from time-varying di erences between treatment and control rms that are correlated with the passage of the laws. We deal with this problem by allowing the e ect of observables|assets, sales, employment, market value|to vary with state of time in Table 4 .
EMPIRICAL Methodology
At its heart, our test uses di erences-in-di erences, comparing states that pass anti-takeover legislation referred to as treatment states to states not passing such l a ws control states before and after the law. In the rst level of di erences, we subtract wages w after the law from wages before the law, giving us two sets of di erences: T w for the treatment group and C w for the control group. By itself, T w could bea misleading estimator of the laws' impact since other changes contemporaneous with the laws a ect this estimate. To deal with this, we i n troduce a second level of di erences. If contemporaneous shocks a ect treatment and control groups in roughly similar ways, then those shocks should also be contained in C w. One can therefore subtract C w from the rst di erence T w to estimate the e ect of the law.
This approach can be easily understood with an example. Suppose we wish to estimate the e ect of the Pennsylvania law passed in 1989. We would subtract wages after 1989 from wages before 1989 for the Pennsylvania rms. However, other things in 1989, such as a recession, may have a ected Pennsylvania rms. Choosing a control state, for example New Jersey, would help control for changing economic conditions. If New Jersey rms were also subject to this recession, the change in their wages would bea measure of its severity. We would, therefore, compare the di erence in wages in Pennsylvania before and after 1989, to the di erence in wages in New Jersey before and after 1989. The di erence of those two di erences would serve as the estimate of the law's e ect in Pennsylvania.
We present a rough cut of the data using this approach in Table 2 . The main problem with such an approach is that "after the law" is not well de ned since states passed the law at di erent times. We, therefore, de ne "After" to be after the law for passing states, but after 1985 for states that aren't passing. 1985 was chosen because the rst laws were passed then. This simple di erences-in-di erences produces a 3 increase in wages. We see that BC states increased wages over the sample period much faster than non-BC states. Because of the staggered nature of the laws, however, this is an imperfect technique.
In practice, therefore, we implement this approach in a regression framework, which has three advantages. First, we can include rm xed e ects which allows for more precise controls than simply di erencing across states and time. Second, as stated, many laws were passed and at di erent times. By de ning an After Law" dummy rm by rm, we can easily allow for the staggering of laws. Finally, we can control for time-varying observables of the rm. Let i index rms and t years, w it bethe log wage, X it be rm characteristics such as size, BC i bea dummy indicating that rm i is incorporated a state passing a BC law, and After it be a dummy v ariable for after the law After it equals 1 if the law has been passed by time t, which gives a oneyear delay in the law's e ect. This allows for lags in implementation as well as the fact that the data may re ect values from the previous calendar year. We estimate: w it = t + i + X it + BC i After it + it 1 Our estimate of the law's e ect is , the coe cient on the interaction term: change in wages, speci c to rms incorporated in a state that coincide with the passage of legislation. One important implication of staggered passage dates is that we no longer need our control group to be states that do not pass laws. The above speci cation can beestimated even if all states eventually passed a law. It implicitly takes all rms incorporated in states not passing a law at time t as the control group for a law passed at time t, e v en if they have already passed one or will pass one later. The necessity of this can be seen in Table B , which lists states and year of enactment for the laws. Even though only twenty-eight states total pass a law in our sample period, almost all of the large states eventually pass a BC law. 18 There are two sources of variation we d o not use. First, a few of these laws had opt out provisions so that rms could, if they chose, make themselves exempt from the laws. However, since opting out is endogenous|because managers play a crucial role in deciding to opt out, rms that do opt out will have di erent levels of discretion from those that do not|using this information will corrupt estimates. We are, therefore, estimating the gross e ect of hav i n g a B C l a w with an opt-out provision rather than the e ect of having a BC law. These opt out provisions do not change the qualitative implications of managerial discretion on wages, though they may lessen the magnitude of e ect. A second, related, source of variation comes from rm changes of anti-takeover provisions in response to the law. Again, because of its endogeneity, w e do not exploit this variation. Table 3 presents various estimates of equation 1. Each speci cation contains year dummies and rm xed e ects. In columns 2, 4, 6 and 8, we further control for log assets, log employment, log sales and log market value. Columns 1 and 2 use the entire set of rm-year cells for which we were able to compute a wage measure. In columns 3 to 6, we exclude rms whose wages grow t o o much or drop too much a t a n y point in time. In columns 3 and 4, we use growth rates of 75 and its inverse as the cuto : . Finally, columns 7 and 8 use the full sample but estimates a median regression. However, since median regression with rm xed e ects is computationally intractable for us, we use state of incorporation xed e ects instead.
RESULTS
BASIC Results
Before discussing the e ect of the BC laws, let's rst brie y review the other determinants of log wage. While log assets and log sales are positively correlated with log wage, log market value does not appear to additionally in uence wages. In all speci cations, we nd a strong negative sign on log employment. The coe cients on those four determinants of rm size are such that a doubling of the size of a rm leads to a 2 to 3 decrease in wages. This seems at odds with the standard rm size-wage e ect where larger rms appear to pay higher wages. However, the strong negative correlation between wages and employment i s v ery likely caused by measurement error. Since the wage measure is de ned as labor expenses divided by employment, any measurement error in the employment variable will show up in the wage variable, and will negatively bias the employment coe cient. In regressions that are not reported here, we have instrumented log employment with the lagged value of log employment in order to reduce measurement error. We h a ve found that the employment coe cient stays negative but is about 50 to 60 smaller in absolute value. The rm size-wage e ect implied by the instrumental variables estimation is such that a doubling of the size of a rm increases wages by about 1. In Table 4 , we also estimate the basic equation without employment as an independent v ariable.
In all the columns, we nd a consistent 1 t o 1 :7 increase in wages due to the passage of the laws. The estimates become more precise as we exclude more of the aberrant w age data, although the mean e ect does not change much. The addition of controls in columns 2, 4 and 6 does not qualitatively alter the estimated coe cient. Finally, the median regression produces an extremely noisy estimate, though essentially the same number. For the remainder of the paper, we will restrict ourselves to the 75-46 rule, though the ndings are not sensitive to this restriction. Table 2 in the Appendix brie y examines the impact of the two other major anti-takeover statutes on wages: FP and CSA. The results con rm our analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Column 2 shows that FP statutes have a small positive but insigni cant impact on wages. CSA statutes do not appear to have a n y impact on wages column 3. In addition, the impact of FP statute and CSA statute on wages is statistically and economically insigni cant once we control for the impact of the BC statute column 4. This re ects the fact that many states passing CSA or FP statutes later passed BC laws.
ROBUSTNESS Checks
While the basic regressions indicates that these laws a ected wages, several concerns may remain.
We deal with these in Table 4 .
First, an important assumption of the di erences-in-di erences methodology is that shocks contemporaneous with the laws a ect treatment and control groups similarly. This assumption can beproblematic if the treatment and control groups are dissimilar on observable and potentially unobservable characteristics. As we have seen in Table 1 , the set of rms incorporated in states passing BC laws are larger in every size dimension market value, sales, assets and, to a lesser extent, employment. Since states pass laws at di erent times, this is less of a problem. BC states themselves serve a s controls for all states that pass laws at di erent times. Nevertheless, one worries that shocks contemporaneous with the law that di erentially a ect large rms may still corrupt our estimates.
Column 1 of Table 4 deals with this problem by allowing the returns to assets, employment, sales and market value to change over time. That is, we allow a di erent coe cient on these covariates for each single year. Suppose that an aggregate shock raised wages in large rms. As the treatment rms are larger, if this shock coincided with the passage of some of the laws, our estimate of the e ect of the BC legislation would bebiased. Part of the estimated treatment e ect would indeed come from this shock. Allowing covariates to vary by time controls for any such shock. If shocks to any of these observables contemporaneous with the laws corrupt our results, we expect the coe cient on the treatment variable to signi cantly drop. Comparing columns 1 in Table 4 to column 4 in Table 3 , we see that our estimate of the e ect of the BC laws remains virtually unchanged.
Second, the di erences-in-di erences estimate will also be corrupted if wages in the BC group were following a di erent trend than wages in the non-BC group. This concern is again lessened by the staggering of laws. Nevertheless, we deal with this problem directly in column 2 by allowing for a di erent trend term for the BC and non-BC rms. As one can see, our results are not a ected by this inclusion. 19 In column 3, we cumulate these related speci cation checks by including a treatment trend and allowing the returns to all covariates to vary over time. Again, the results stay the same.
Third, we might worry that changes in economic conditions of the states leads to passage of these laws. This would corrupt our estimates if these conditions also a ected wages. In column 4, we include state unemployment as a regressor and again nd no change in the point estimate.
Fourth, we might worry that having log employment as a regressor may bias many of the coe cients since the left hand side variable is de ned as log wage bill divided by log employment.
Column 5 replicates the basic regression with log employment dropped and we again the coe cient remains unchanged.
Fifth, given the large number of rms are incorporated in Delaware, one might w orry that our results are driven by this one data point. In column 6, we replicate the basic regression but with Delaware rms excluded from the sample. The estimated treatment e ect stays signi cant, and the point estimate is actually larger than in column 4 of Table 3 . This result is in concordance with Romano's extensive analysis of state anti-takeover laws. Romano 1993 claims that the BC statute in Delaware was relatively weak compared to other states.
DISTRIBUTION of Treatment E ect
The results in the previous sections have established the mean e ect of BC laws. One is also interested in the distribution of this e ect. Table 5 addresses this issue by interacting the BC i After it term with rm level characteristics. We also allow the coe cient on the relevant rm characteristic to vary by y ear and by BCand non-BC rms. To make the coe cient on the direct BC i After it term easier to interpret, we have demeaned each of the rm level characteristics.
Therefore, the coe cient on BC i After it represents the e ect of BC laws for a rm of average size. As the results in Table 5 indicate, larger rms appear to have bigger wage increases after the passage of the anti-takeover laws.
A priori reasoning does not give much assistance in determining whether wages in large rms should be more or less a ected by anti-takeover legislation than wages in small rms. On the one hand, larger rms may have more dispersed ownership making takeovers a more important disciplining device, so the e ect on wages should bebigger. On the other hand, the takeover of larger rms may in general be harder since it requires more capital, so the e ect on wages should be smaller. Our empirical ndings support the rst story.
TREATMENT Dynamics
In the previous section, we i n vestigated how the e ect of the passage of the BC laws was distributed across rms. In Table 6 , we investigate how the e ect is distributed over time. We estimate the following regression: logw it = t + i + X it + BC i After it + 0 BC i Before 0 it + ,1 BC i Before ,1 it + it which includes two Be fo re it terms to capture leads. Be fo re 0 it is a dummy for the year the law passed and Be fo re ,1 it is a dummy for the year before the law passed. In Table 6 , we also break apart the After it dummy into dynamic terms where After s it refers to a dummy for s years after the law and After s it refers to a dummy that is one if the law w as passed strictly more than s years ago.
In column 1, we investigate the e ects of the law, 1 year after, 2 years after and more than 2 years after the law. We nd that most of the law's e ects are in the third and later years. In column 2, we look for evidence of an e ect the year the law w as passed and the year before the passage of the law. This serves as a useful consistency check. It is comforting that we nd no signi cant e ect before or contemporaneous with the laws passage. Section 7 further argues that this is evidence against endogeneity of the laws. Finally, in column 3, we estimate the full regression allowing for e ects before and year by y ear after. The results are consistent with our ndings in columns 1 and 2.
INTERPRETATION
What can explain our ndings? We can easily dismiss a compensating di erentials interpretation.
At best, takeovers reduce layo s, but by reducing the fear of job loss, compensating di erentials should rise. 20 The theory of compensating di erentials, therefore, predicts that anti-takeover statutes should, if anything, increase wages.
A second worry comes from concerns about the endogeneity of the takeover laws themselves.
In practice, they might bethe result of changing economic conditions and such changes may be correlated with workers' wages. For example, if states with rising wages or those expecting wages to rise passed anti-takeover legislation, then the estimated e ect will be biased upward. The evidence already presented suggests that this is not the case. First, column 4 of Table 4, shows that including controls for state economic conditions does not a ect the estimates. Second, if underlying trends in wages give rise to these laws, we expect our estimates to drop when we explicitly allow for such trends in legislating states. As we saw in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 , the estimated treatment e ect hardly changes when we include a treatment trend. Second, if short term changes in economic conditions give rise to the anti-takeover laws, we might expect to nd some e ect" of the laws prior to passage. In columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 , we included lead dummies for the year the law passed and the year before the law passed. Neither of the lead dummies was ever signi cant. These three ndings suggest that our results are not driven by political economy biases.
A similar but alternative explanation for our results can come from a survivorship bias induced by the raw e ect of the laws on the number of takeovers. Suppose takeovers are more likely to occur in high wage rms. This will not be a problem since we include rm xed e ects which will capture higher wages of taken over rms. For takeovers to drive our ndings, they must bemore likely in high wage growth rms. Then, these laws reduce takeovers and therefore increase the relative number of high wage growth rms. Therefore, mean wage rises not through the diminished threat but through the reduction of the actual number of takeovers. Thus our results might be driven by a reduction in the actual probability of takeover after the passage of the laws. We feel that this explanation is not very relevant because actual takeovers are very rare events. Even if these laws completely eliminated takeovers, wage growth in rms taken over would have to besigni cantly higher than average wage growth in order to explain the 1 , 2 wage e ect.
We also feel con dent in ruling out an e ciency wage interpretation of our result. Under an e ciency wage story, the increase in workers' wages could be regarded as owners' optimal response to a decrease in the level of monitoring by managers after the anti-takeover laws. While theoretically possible, this story is totally at odds with the institutional details of human resource practices in large rms. It requires that owners shareholders control worker wages, a practice unheard of in large public corporations Foulkes, 1980 and Milkovich and Newman, 1987 . One may w onder why the question of discretion in wage setting is interesting if it is clear that managers have complete control over the wage setting process. The key empirical question in this paper is whether managers exercise this control in a pro t maximizing way or in a self-serving way. Even when managers have complete control, forces such as incentive s c hemes may make them behave in a pro t maximizing way for all practical purposes. Thus, the question of whether discretion distorts wages is an empirical one.
At this point, we feel that we can reasonably assert that managerial discretion is likely responsible for the wage increases. However, discretion may operate through several di erent channels. First, our results give little guidance as to which employees in the rm bene t from the wage raise. One possibility is that all workers get the raise equally. Another is that some subgroups, for example white collar workers, receive a disproportionate share. Such an interpretation would besupported by Lichtenberg's 1992 nding of larger impacts of ownership changes on auxiliary as opposed to manufacturing branches of the rm. A simple calculation suggests, though, that these the gains could not have been isolated to the top most layer of management alone. The mean wage in our sample is about $30; 000 and the mean employment is about 19; 000. A lower bound 1 pay raise represents $300 perworker or $5; 700; 000 peryear for the mean rm. Using A second dimension where we are unclear how discretion operates is whether the pay increases represent pure rent transfers or not. One way they may not represent pure rent transfers is if the higher wages represent an increase in the quality of workers. Managers may choose an excessive level of quality, for example to minimize their private cost of providing training. Another possibility, as would happen in gift-exchange models, is that workers increase unobserved e ort in response to the higher wages.
Shleifer and Summers 1988 provide another model in which the wage increases will be accompanied by pro t increases. In their model, workers make non-contractible investments in rmspeci c human capital and managers sign implicit contracts to compensate workers for these investments. The quasi-rents generated by the investments create a time-consistency problem. Since these investments are sunk, wages can be cut ex post and workers never renumerated for their investment. They argue that incumbent managers are more likely to honor implicit contracts to repay w orkers than outsiders or owners are. This assumption is a dynamic equivalent of our static assumption that managers prefer to pay higher wages. Thus in their theory, managerial discretion raises worker wages because managers have a preference for honoring the existing implicit contracts.
This preference then induces human capital investments which raise wages. In this case, managerial discretion enhances shareholder wealth because it solves the time-inconsistency problem.
Thus, in a pure rent-seeking model, pro ts go down dollar for dollar with the wage bill. In these other models, pro ts decrease only a fraction or possibly increase with each extra dollar.
We can attempt to discriminate between the pure rent story and these other stories by comparing the quantitative impact of the laws on shareholder value with the quantitative impact on wages.
The average stock price reaction to these laws about ,:5 according to Karpo and Malatesta does not appear large enough to explain a 1 to 2 pure increase in labor cost. Assuming that labor costs are about four times pro ts, a permanent 1 to 2 increase in wage will imply a 4 to 8 drop in pro ts, which in turn implies a 4 to 8 drop in rm value. One would have to believe a huge impact of these laws to believe that these wages represent pure rent transfers. Recall that Karpo and Malatesta 1989 found only a ,:5 drop. This suggests that while increased managerial discretion must have caused some rent dissipation, the higher wages it caused also likely increased the worker quality pool, induced higher e ort, deterred breach of trust or in some other way resulted increased pro t.
CONCLUSION
State anti-takeover legislation provides plausibly exogenous variation in the degree of the agency problem. We have used this variation to test for the e ect of managerial discretion on wages.
Using a di erences-in-di erences approach, we h a ve demonstrated that wages rose following these laws. Our results support many previously untested popular perceptions about the preference of managers for paying high wages. Since larger rms are more likely to bepublicly owned and in general have more dispersed ownership, these results also suggest that the rm size-wage e ect may partly re ect a managerial discretion e ect. 21 The ndings in this paper depict a wage setting process that implies, to use Reynolds' 1951 term, a range of indeterminateness." Moral hazard between managers and owners means that wages will re ect the diversity of managerial preferences and discretion. In that sense, this paper presents a serious challenge to standard models of wage determination, all of which posit managerial pro t maximization. Footnotes 1. In an optimal contracting model, one would expect that shareholders would have o set some of this change by increasing the use of pay for performance incentives for managers. Bertrand and Mullainathan 1996 nd evidence that CEO compensation became more sensitive to performance, relative to a control group, after the passage of the laws. But, we would not expect shareholders' reaction to completely o set the distortion. What remains is the source of our variation.
2. Examining the impact on employment levels would also beinteresting. Unfortunately, our data are too noisy to allow this.
3. Hannan and Mavinga 1980 go further by looking at the interaction between concentration and ownership. They argue that managerial discretion requires both the absence of a strong owner and a lack of product market discipline.
4. A useful summary of this literature along with e ects of ownership changes on other variables can be found in Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny 1990.
5. Krueger's variation is perhaps the most direct. However, the allocation of company stores between owner-operated and franchises may itself be endogenous to the characteristics of the labor market. For example, a company may prefer to start franchises in areas where the quality of the labor pool is on average poorer and requires more monitoring.
6. The second generation laws were deemed constitutional primarily because they restricted the jurisdiction of the laws to only rms incorporated in that state. With this precedent in place, challenges to third generation laws never reached the Supreme Court, even though these laws were much more stringent in practice.
7. Less common types of statutes were passed by a few states, but we do not consider them here.
8. We brie y summarize the other laws. CSAs give noninterested shareholders the right to decide whether large shareholders should have any v oting rights. This makes it harder for a raider to use the votes he has acquired. One reason why CSAs may h a ve little e ect on disciplinary takeovers is that shareholders, not the board, have the rights to block a takeover. In fact, by weakening the free-riding problem in takeovers Grossman and Hart, 1980 , they may have actually made disciplinary takeovers easier. FPs require shareholders acquiring beyond a threshold level to pay a fair price" for all stocks acquired unless the board approves otherwise. Fair prices are usually de ned as some function of the highest price paid to any shareholder for some time period prior to the takeover announcement. FPs impede takeovers because they make it harder for the raider to o er high prices early on and then lower prices to later sales, the commonly used two tier o ers. Since FP laws require board approval, though they sometimes require both the board and shareholder approval, they are more similar to the BC laws. We decide not to concentrate on them because previous empirical evidence show that they were relatively weak in practice see Section 3.2. Appendix Table 2 con rms this.
9. Some of the laws also had other minor clauses, of which the most relevant deal with labor contracts. These specify that raiders who acquire control of a corporation should honor pre-existing collective bargaining contracts. Though the e ect will be minor, if anything the increased security provided by these laws should decrease wages as a compensating di erential, generating a downward bias on our estimates. 11. Garvey and Hanka forthcoming study the impact of these laws on a di erent v ariable: rm leverage. They nd that a ected rms decrease their leverage.
12. The main trouble comes from choosing an event date, since information about these laws may be incorporated into prices well before formal passage. For us, the problem of choosing a treatment date is less problematic since wages are reported and decided upon on an annual basis. Easterbrook and Fischel 1991 summarize the literature on the individual laws and contend that these laws had, roughly, ,:5 e ect on prices.
13. These considerations e ectively rule out large individual level data sets such a s t h e Current Population Survey. The a ected" group would then be hard to measure. We w ould have t o use everyone living in the state that passes the law. This creates three problems. First, we include residents of the state that work for a company incorporated in another state. Second, we include residents that work for a company not a ected by the laws because the companies are privately held. Third, we excluded all a ected individuals who live elsewhere but work for a company incorporated in that state.
14. This is the reason we do not use employment as a dependent variable. Preliminary regressions using it veri ed this: our point estimates had quite large standard errors. While the employment e ect of takeover legislation is extremely interesting, we are not able to examine it using this data.
15. While the mean growth rate of wages is 2 and the median growth rate is 1, the bottom one percentile of the distribution has wage growth rates below ,30 and the top one percentile has wage growth rates above 46.
16. The restriction on having continuous wage data is so that we can identify wage growth outliers.
17. Virtually all of this di erence arises from dropping rms with no wage data rather than dropping rms with aberrant wage data. This is to be expected since the aberrant wage changes results in a loss of only 500 or so rm-year observations.
18. Texas passed a law in 1997 after the paper was written.
19. The coe cient on the pre-existing trend term for BC states is small and insigni cant. ,1996 1983-1984=100. 2 . FULL is the set of rm-year observations in COMPUSTAT for rms with nonmissing state or country of incorporation and incorporated in the U.S.. SAMPLE is the set of rm-year observations in FULL for which w age data are available; it only includes rms for which the annual wage growth rate is always below 75 and always over -44. BC and No BC are the set of rm-year obervations in SAMPLE with rms incorporated in states passing a business combination statute and no business combination statute respectively. 3. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 4. The means of the variables in levels are listed in brackets. 5. Sample Size is the number of rm-year observations in sample for which at least one of the variables in list is available. Because market value and sales are missing for a few rm-year observations, the number of rm-year observations in SAMPLE for which all variables in list are available is 9108. Log Employment is log of total employment in thousands; Log Sales is the log of net sales in millions; Log Market Value is the log market value of the rm in millions. Wages, assets, sales and market value are de ated using the CPI IFS, 1996 1983-1984=100. 2. Sample in columns 1, 2, 7 and 8 contains all the rm-year observations for which wage is computable. Sample in columns 3 and 4 contains all the rms for which the wage growth rate is always below 75 and always above -44. Sample in columns 5 and 6 contains all the rms for which the wage growth rate is always below 50 and always above -33. 3. Columns 7 and 8 re ects a median regression. 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 5. denotes signi cance at the 10; at the 5; at the 1; at the .1. Log Assets is the log of total start of year assets in millions; Log Employment i s log of total employment in thousands; Log Sales is the log of net sales in millions; Log Market Value is the log market value of the rm in millions. Wages, assets, sales and market value are de ated using the CPI IFS, 1996 1983-1984=100. Before ,1 is a dummy that equals 1 for the year before the law passed; Before 0 is a dummy that equals 1 for the year the law passed; After 1 is a dummy that equals 1 for the year after the law passed; After 2 is a dummy that equals 1 for two y ears after the law passed; After 2 is a dummy that equals 1 for strictly more than two years after the law passed. 2. Sample in all columns contains all the rms for which the wage growth rate is always below 75 and always above -44. Sample Size: 9108. 3. All regressions also include year xed e ects, rm xed e ects, Log Assets, Log Employment, Log Sales and Log Market Value. 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 5. denotes signi cance at the 5; at the 1. 2. Sample in all columns contains all the rms for which the wage growth rate is always below 75 and always above -44. 3. denotes signi cance at the 10; at the 5; at the 1; at the .1.
